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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 (1989), 78-2-2(3) (e)(ii)
and 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1993).
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the Utah State Tax Commission properly determine that
fuel used in the operation of a motor vehicle on the public
highways of the state was taxable?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Legislature has codified the standard of review to
be applied on appeals from the Utah State Tax Commission.

Where

the Legislature has granted discretion to the Commission to
interpret a statute, the Commission's interpretation will be
reviewed for reasonableness.
610(1)(b) (Supp. 1993).

See

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-

See also, South Davis Community Hosp. v.

Dep't of Health, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 33 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588
(Utah 1991) and Utah Dep't of Admin. Services v. Public Services
Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983).
The statute in question is Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-3011(2)(a) which provides for an exemption from Special Fuel tax.
That section states:
this exemption applies only in those cases where the
purchasers or the users of special fuel establish to
the satisfaction of the commission that the special
fuel was used for purposes other than to operate a
motor vehicle upon the public highways of the state;

This language explicitly grants discretion to the Tax
Commission.

Therefore, this Court should uphold the Tax

Commission's findings if they are within the "bounds of
reasonableness."
In reviewing the Tax Commission's findings under this
standard the court should also consider that tax exemptions
should be narrowly construed against the party seeking the
exemption, and the party seeking the exemption bears the burden
of showing they are entitled thereto.

See Parson Asphalt

Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah
1980) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following determinative sections are set forth verbatim in
Appendix 1.
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-102(3)(d)(i) (1992 & Supp.
1993) .

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-102(7) (1992 & Supp. 1993).

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(1) (1992).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2) (1992).

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(3) (1992).

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-302(2)(a) (1992).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-501(1)(7) (1992).

8.

Tax Comm. Rules R865-4-2D(B)(1)(2) (1993-94).

9.

Tax Comm. Rules R865-4-2D(D) (1993-94).

10.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) (Supp. 1993).

11.

IFTA Articles of Agreement § I.C (1993).

12.

IFTA Articles of Agreement § III.C (1993).

13.

IFTA Procedures Manual § IV.A.9 (1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a the Tax Commission's denial of

Petitioners' requests for refunds of special fuel taxes.

The

trucking companies affected by the Tax Commission decision below,
as represented by C.V. Sohn, appealed the FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL DECISION of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Commission") dated November 23, 1993, (Appeal No.
93-0615, consolidated with 93-0617, 93-0618 & 93-0619) (R. 4)
wherein the Commission adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Final Decision detailed in its ORDER dated October 15,
1993 as its Final Decision in all of the above mentioned cases.
(R. 7)

The October 15, 1993 order found that the Legislature

defined
special fuel as any fuel usable to operate £r propel a
motor vehicle upon the highways of the state. The use
of the word "or" to separate the word "operate" from
"propel" evidences a legislative intent to list two
separate and distinct processes either of which would
render the special fuel subject to taxation.
(R. 26, 27. original emphasis.)
II.

Course of the Proceedings
Each of the several trucking companies involved in the

consolidated appeals below filed amended fuel tax returns with
3

the Operations Division of the Utah State Tax Commission seeking
refunds of tax paid on "special fuel" consumed in "nonpropulsion" operation of its vehicles.

The Operations Division

denied each of these refunds on the basis that fuel consumed in a
"non-propulsion" mode was consumed while operating a vehicle on
the public highways and was therefore taxable under Utah's Motor
and Special Fuel Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-13 (The Act).

Each

company then filed a Petition for Redetermination with the
Commission, seeking review of the Operations Division's decision.
(R. 149)
A prehearing conference was held April 22, 1993 at which the
above-mentioned matters were consolidated.

(R. 135)

On August

17, 1993 the Commission heard Petitioners' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the issue of Petitioners' liability for
"special fuel" tax on fuel consumed during "non-propulsion"
operation.

The Commission issued its Order finding: "fuel

consumed in the nonpropulsion [sic] operation of a motor vehicle
on the public highways of the state is subject to special fuel
tax" on October 15, 1993.

(R. 27)

On October 26, 1993, Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment.

(R. 10)

Pursuant to

this motion and Petitioners' October 30, 1993 Stipulation (R. 9)
the Commission issued its Final Order and Decision on November
23, 1993.

(R. 6)

Petitioner's then filed this appeal.

4

(R. 4)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts were stipulated below.
1.

(R. W-10)

Each of the Petitioners is an interstate trucking

company which operates motor vehicles at various times upon the
public highways of the State of Utah, transporting primarily
property and goods.
2.

The vehicles operated by Petitioners consumed diesel

fuel which is defined by § 59-13-102 as "special fuel".
3.

In the operation of their motor vehicles in the State

of Utah, Petitioners normally and customarily consume special
fuel while their vehicles are stopped with the motors running.
4.

Each of the Petitioners files a quarterly report

showing the amount of special fuel consumed by each carrier
without differentiating between that fuel which is consumed while
its vehicles are being propelled over the highways of the state
from that fuel which is being consumed while its vehicles are in
a "non-propulsion" mode.
5.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(1)(2)(a) requires each of

the Petitioners to pay a motor fuel tax on special fuel consumed
in the operation or propulsion of a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of the state.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Special fuel consumed by Petitioners is taxable.

Exemptions

from taxation must be narrowly construed against the taxpayer.
Petitioners have failed to meet their burden of showing to the
5

satisfaction of the Commission that the fuel they claim is exempt
falls squarely within the exemption provided by law.

The Tax

Commission found that Petitioners' non-propulsion operation was
operation of a motor vehicle and thus taxable under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-13-301.
This court need not look beyond the plain language of the
statutory exemption to determine the Legislature's intent in
enacting it.

It must be assumed that the Legislature uses each

word in a statute advisedly.

Thus, when the Legislature included

the word "operate" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301 taxing special
fuel use it should be assumed that it intended that word to be
understood in accordance with its regularly accepted meaning.
Petitioners did not raise an Equal Protection issue or
argument during the course of the proceedings below and should
not be allowed to raise this issue for the first time on appeal.
Even so, there is a rational basis to distinguish between
Petitioners' operations and the exempt uses recognized by the
Commission.
Utah Law does not conflict with the International Fuel Tax
Agreement (IFTA).

IFTA allows each jurisdiction to determine

which uses are exempt and does not include an exemption for "nonpropulsion" operation.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

FUEL CONSUMED BY PETITIONERS IS TAXABLE.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301 states:
(1) A tax is imposed at the rate of 19 cents per gallon
on the sale or use of special fuel. . . .
(3) The special fuel tax shall be paid by the userdealer in all cases where the special fuel is sold
within the state and delivered directly into the fuel
supply tank of a motor vehicle. . . .(emphasis added).
This section imposes tax on the sale or use of special fuel

within the state.

Use is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-

102(7 ) and means:
the consumption of special fuel for the operation or
the propulsion of a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of the state and includes the reception of
special fuel into the fuel supply tank of a motor
vehicle. (emphasis added).
Under authority granted in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-501, Utah has
adopted the provisions of the International Fuel Tax Agreement
("IFTA").

Section III.C of the IFTA Articles of Agreement

states:
All motor fuel acquired that is normally subject to
consumption tax is taxable unless proof to the contrary
is provided by the licensee.
There is no question that the fuel sought to be taxed in the
instant case was "used" by Petitioner.

When the fuel is placed

in the supply tank of Petitioners' motor vehicles the fuel is
"used" as defined by statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(3).

The concept of fuel being taxable when "delivered into the fuel
tank of a motor vehicle" is repeated in §§ 59-13-301(2) (c)f 597

13-301(4), 59-13-302(2)(a) and Rules R865-4-2D(B)(2), R865-42D(C)(2) and R856-4-2D(D).

Rule R865-4-2D(B) states:

The tax shall be collected and paid to the state by the
user-dealer in all cases where the fuel is sold and
delivered directly into the service tank of a motor
vehicle. . . . (emphasis added).
The IFTA provisions support this concept and create a
presumption of taxation when the fuel is placed in the supply
tank of a motor vehicle.

The Procedures Manual for IFTA tax

reporting, Section IV.A.9 states:
The licensee must report all fuel placed in the storage
tank of a qualified motor vehicle as taxable on the
IFTA tax report. Jurisdictions may define tax-exempt
fuel. The licensee must submit a claim for refund for
tax paid on tax-exempt fuel directly to the respective
jurisdiction. ,fl
There is no question that all fuel taxed in this case was
placed in the supply tanks of Petitioners' motor vehicles.

The

Court must start therefore with the presumption that the fuel
consumed by Petitioners is taxable.
II.

PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT THEIR USE QUALIFIES FOR
THE EXEMPTION.
In order to prevail in this appeal, Petitioner must clearly

demonstrate that there was no rational basis, on the record
below, for the Commission to determine that the fuel consumed in
"non-propulsion operation" was taxable "operation of a motor
vehicle".

1

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2) exempts fuel which:

As amended by Ballot 7-1992 Ratified Nov. 26, 1992.
8

(a) is sold or used for any purpose other than to
operate or propel a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of the state, but this exemption applies only
in those cases where the purchasers or the users of
special fuel establish to the satisfaction of the
commission that the special fuel was used for purposes
other than to operate a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of the state; (emphasis added).
Exemptions to taxation are to be narrowly construed and the
burden of showing that the activity comes within the exemption
rests with the person seeking exemption-

See Parson, supra.

Petitioners can not meet this burden.
"Operate" is defined as "to control or direct the
functioning of."2

"Propel" has a much more limited meaning; "to

cause to move or sustain in motion."3

The limitation on the

exemption clearly states that the user of fuel "must establish to
the satisfaction of the Commission that the special fuel was used
for purposes other than to operate a motor vehicle . . . ."
Petitioners argue that fuel used in "non-propulsion operation" is
not taxable.
propulsion.

This argument focuses only on the concept of
Operation of a motor vehicle is not limited solely

to propulsion but includes all necessary functions of the
vehicle.
The Legislature clearly states that unless the fuel was used
for a purpose other than to operate a motor vehicle, then it is

2

Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 823 (1st
ed. 1988).
3

Id. at 943.
9

taxable.

The Legislature delegated discretion to the Tax

Commission to determine whether the exemption applies to specific
facts.

The Commission's determination that Petitioners' use of

the fuel to keep its trucks running while the air brake was set
constituted "operation" of a motor vehicle is rational and must
be affirmed.
III. THIS COURT NEED NOT LOOK BEYOND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
STATUTE TO DETERMINE THAT PETITIONERS' USE OF SPECIAL FUEL
IS TAXABLE.
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that:
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
appellate courts cannot look beyond the language to
divine legislative intent, but must construe the
statute according to its plain language.
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) citing
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); State v.
Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 832
P.2d 476 (Utah 1992) .
A.

"OPERATE" AND "PROPEL" ARE PLAINLY NOT SYNONYMS.

The statute in question is Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2)(a)
(1992) which states:
No tax is imposed upon special fuel which: is sold or
used for any purpose other than to operate or propel a
motor vehicle upon the public highways of the state,
Petitioners argue that the words "operate" and "propel" have the
same meaning in this context.
have the same meaning.

These two words clearly do not

As noted above, Webster's defines

10

"operate" as "[t]o control or direct the functioning of."*
"propel" as "[t]o cause to move or sustain in motion."5

and

It

seems clear that one can "operate" without necessarily
"propelling", and vice versa.

Thus the words plainly and

unambiguously define two separate and distinct actions, both of
which may be subject to taxation in this context.
At the hearing, Petitioners' argued that the phrase "operate
or propel" is akin to the phrase "cease and desist".

(Tr. 15)

However, "cease" and "desist" are synonyms,6 one cannot "cease"
without also "desisting" and vice versa.

Also, the statutory

language used throughout Utah Code Annotated chapter 59-13 uses
the word or as in "operate or propel" rather than the word

"and"

as in "cease and desist".
B.

THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND "OPERATE" AND
"PROPEL" TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS SYNONYMOUS.

The Utah Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that
legislative intent may be discerned from the language of the
statute in question.

Thus, in State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d

492 (Utah App. 1993) the Court of Appeals cited a Utah Supreme
Court decision in declaring that

A

Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, supra at

823.
5

Id. at 943.

6

Webster's defines both as "Stop" and uses "cease" to define
"desist". Id.
11

we construe the statute to give effect to legislative
intent in so far as possible, and in doing so, assume
"the Legislature used each term advisedly, and we give
effect to each term according to its ordinary
and
accepted
meaning."
JEd., supra at 493, 494. Quoting Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l.
Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992).

See also State v. Paul, 8

P.2d 992 (Utah App. 1993), In re Adoption of M.L.T., 746 P.2d
1179 (Utah App. 1987) and Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 70
(Utah 1985) .
Petitioners seem to agree, in principle, arguing that "The
intent of the [Legislature must be discerned from the language
which it uses." (Petitioners' Brief at 11) and "all

words and

phrases used in the statute are to be construed in accordance
with their meanings and definitions." (.Id. at 9)

In support of

these arguments, Petitioners cite Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990) which
"mandates that a statute be read according to its literal
wording."

However, Petitioners then argue that the statute

should not be read literally but rather that the "accepted
meaning" of the word "operate" should be ignored.
As the Tax Commission noted in its October 15th Order,
[Utah Code Ann.] § 59-13-102(3)(d) [1992] defines
special fuel as any fuel usable as a fuel to operate or
propel a motor vehicle upon the highways of the state.
The use of the word "or" to separate the word "operate"
from [the word] "propel" evidences a legislative intent
to list two separate and distinct processes either of
which would render the special fuel subject to
taxation.
12

(R. 26, 27. original emphasis.)

Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2)(a)

(1992) clearly and unambiguously defines the circumstances under
which the exemption applies:
but this exemption applies only in those cases where
the purchasers or users of special fuel establish to
the satisfaction of the commission that the special
fuel was used for purposes other than to overate
a,
motor vehicle upon the public highways of the state.
The Legislature left the word "propel" out of this part of the
code, giving the word "operate" its own significance and meaning
independent of the word "propel".

In fact, this section suggests

that if the Legislature intended for one of the two words to have
more importance than the other, it is the word "operate", since
propulsion is not a factor in determining whether the exemption
applies.

At the very least it clearly indicates that the

Legislature intended to tax special fuel used to operate

a motor

vehicle on the highways of the state.
C.

PETITIONERS OFFER NO SUPPORT FOR IGNORING THE PLAIN
MEANING OF THE STATUTE.

Petitioners ignore the "accepted meaning" of the word
"operate", robbing it of any meaning at all by arguing that it is
subsumed by the concept of propulsion.

In place of the plain,

literal wording of the statute, Petitioners offer an idea of what
the Legislature may have intended, without citing any authority
to support that idea.

They do not cite any Legislative history

in support of their notion.

Neither do Petitioners cite any case

13

law in support of the proposition that an appellate court should
ignore words used in a statute.
If, as Petitioners argue, the Legislature had intended for
the word "operate" to have no meaning of its own, the "literal
wording" of the statute would not include the word "operate".7
At the very least, the statute could have taxed special fuel used
to "operate a motor vehicle while propelling it on the highways
of the state", thus clearly linking the two separate concepts of
"operation" and "propulsion".

However, as noted above, the

"literal wording" of the statute in question does not link these
two separate concepts.
Petitioners' argument that the sole legislative intent in
taxing the use of special fuels was to tax those who inflict wear
and tear on the state's highways is not only without support but
is contrary to clear statements of the Legislature.

If such were

the case it would be a simple thing to tax each mile logged in
the state without regard to the amount of fuel consumed.8
Further, the Legislature has provided for special fuel tax
exemptions for vehicles powered by a "clean fuel".

Utah Code

Ann. § 59-13-304(1)(b) clearly states that such exemptions are
7

The Idaho State Legislature recently added the word
"operate" to its comparable code section in recognition of the fact
that the words "operate" and "propel" define two distinct taxable
activities. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 344 (H.B. 578).
8

Several states impose tax based on vehicle miles, or a
combination of miles and weight in lieu of or in combination with
a fuel tax.
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"provided to encourage the use of clean fuels to reduce air
pollution" thus showing that the Legislature was concerned about
problems resulting from the use of special fuel other than simply
highway wear and tear.
Finally, Petitioners' admit their trucks do "extraordinary
damage" to the highways.

(Petitioners' Brief at 7.)

However,

they are taxed at the same rate as other fuel purchasers.

By

taxing "operation" as well as propulsion, the legislature may
have intended to tax all of Petitioners' fuel consumption to help
account for the extra stress they put on the state's highways.
D.

IF "OPERATE" AND "PROPEL" WERE SYNONYMOUS, THE
STATUTE WOULD BE INOPERABLE.

Finally, as Petitioners note, (Petitioners' Brief at 10)
Amax, supra supports the idea that a statute should not be
construed so as to make it "unreasonably confusing or
inoperable."

Jd. at 1258.

The Act would be inoperable if the

word "operate" had no meaning as Petitioners claim.

If tax were

imposed solely on fuel consumed in the propulsion of the vehicle,
Petitioner would be entitled to a credit not only for when the
vehicle idled with the parking brake set but for whatever
percentage of special fuel use was due to on-highway idling,
running the air conditioner or any other "non-propulsion
operation."

However, Petitioners have already agreed that such

operation is taxable.

(Tr. 13)
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Petitioners attempt to tie the incidence of taxation to
propulsion ignores the fact that even during propulsion fuel is
consumed for "non-propulsion" activities.

Fuel is consumed to

power the air conditioner, heater, lights, compressors and other
equipment operated during propulsion that are also operated
during "non-propulsion operation."

It would be impossible to

determine or even approximate what percentage of special fuel was
used to operate the other systems during propulsion.
Petitioner would have the Court abandon the plain,
unambiguous language of the statute, and instead adopt a standard
which is inoperable.
IV.

This court should refuse such a request.

THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE "UNIFORM
OPERATION" PRINCIPLES OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
A.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER PETITIONERS' EQUAL
PROTECTION ARGUMENT SINCE IT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW.

At no time during the course of the proceedings below did
Petitioners' raise the question of Equal Protection.

The Supreme

Court of the State of Utah has recently held:
It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not
address issues raised for the first time on appeal
except in extraordinary circumstances that do not exist
here.
State v. Smith, 229 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3, 3 (Utah 1994).

Citing Onq

Int'l, Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993);
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1992) and State v.
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Steqgell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).9

This rule holds

whether or not it is an entirely new issue or just a new argument
that is raised for the first time on appeal.

See Onq, supra at

455, citing Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Ed., 797 P.2d 412,
413 (Utah 1990) citing Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172, 17374 (Utah 1981).

(Other citations omitted).

Since Petitioners

did not raise this question below, this court should not consider
it for the first time on appeal.
B.

WHETHER THE COMMISSION HAS APPLIED THE STATUTE
UNIFORMLY IS JUDGED ON A RATIONAL-BASIS STANDARD.

Petitioners' bring their claim under Article I, section 24
of the Utah State Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that:
In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article I,
§ 24, we must determine whether the classification is
reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative
action are legitimate, and whether there is a
reasonable relationship between the classification and
the legislative purposes.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah
1989), citing Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988) and Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661,

9

See also Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins.
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah 1988); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 232 Ut.
Adv. Rep. 27, 32 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Wade v. Staql, 232 Ut.
Adv. Rep. 19, 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d
922, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) and James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
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670-75 (Utah 1984).

See also. Little America Hotel v. Salt Lake

City, 785 P.2d 1106, 1107-08 (Utah 1989) •10
The Court in Blue Cross, went on to say:
In the tax area, as in other areas of purely economic
regulation, we give broad deference to the legislature
when scrutinizing the reasonableness of its
classifications and their relationship to legitimate
legislative purpose.
Blue Cross at 637. (Citations omitted).

Thus, the first step in

the analysis is to determine the inherent reasonableness of the
classifications themselves.

Id., at 640.

Classifications are not unreasonable or arbitrary as
long as similarly situated people are dealt with in a
similar manner and people situated differently are not
treated as if their circumstances were the same. ...
Thus, the law holds a discrimination invalid only if
there is no reasonable basis for the classification.
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, etc., 655 P.2d 1133, 1137-38 (Utah 1982).
C.

PETITIONERS' USE OF SPECIAL FUEL DIFFERS FROM THOSE
USES RECOGNIZED AS EXEMPT BY THE COMMISSION.

Petitioners are not similarly situated with exempted users.
There is a reasonable basis to distinguish between exempted uses
of special fuel, such as operating power take-off units, and
Petitioners' use of special fuel.

10

In Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-

Petitioners' only stated challenge is to the validity of
the statutory distinction between Petitioners' use of special fuel
in the non-propulsion operation of their motor vehicles and those
who use special fuel for purposes "other than to operate a motor
vehicle" made in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2) (a) . They do not
challenge the legitimacy of the legislative objectives of the Act
nor the rational basis of the relationship between the
classifications and those legislative objectives. Nonetheless, all
three prongs of the test are addressed infra.
18

301(2)(a) the Legislature made clear that unless special fuel was
used for a purpose other than to operate

a motor

vehicle,

that is

to run or to use a motor vehicle, that use would be taxable.

The

Tax Commission has addressed the question of whether fuel used
for "non-propulsion operation" is taxable.

Rule R865-4-2D(D)(5)

states:
Special fuel used on-highway for purposes of idling a
vehicle is not exempt from the special fuel tax since
the fuel is used in the operation

of a motor

vehicle.

(emphasis added).
Thus, the Commission has defined "operation" of "a motor
vehicle" to include idling or "non-propulsion operation."
Commission reiterated this position in its Final Decision.
26, 27)

The
(R.

The key is that Petitioners' do not use the fuel for a

purpose "other than to operate a motor vehicle."

The fact that

the parking brake may be set may indicate that the vehicle is not
being propelled, however, as argued above, this does not mean the
vehicle is not in operation.

While the fuel may not be consumed

to propel the vehicle, fuel consumed in "non-propulsion
operation" is still consumed in the operation of the vehicle.
Petitioners attempt to equate their use of special fuel to
operate a motor vehicle with uses exempted because those uses are
for "purposes other than to operate a motor

vehicle".

In keeping

with this language from Utah Code Ann. 59-13-301(2)(a), Tax
Commission Rule R865-4-2D(D) defines fuel used for "other
purposes" as fuel used to power concrete mixers, garbage
19

compactors, pumps, conveyers, or other unloading equipment that
is not a part of the motor vehicle and not associated with the
normal operation of a motor vehicle.

The rule identifies motor

vehicles with power take-off units where the power take-off is
used to run "auxiliary equipment."

This is a rational

distinction since running auxiliary equipment such as pumps and
conveyers is not deemed "operating a motor vehicle on the public
highways of the state."

While this rule recognizes that fuel

used for these "other purposes" is consumed for purposes "other
than to operate a motor

vehicle"

it specifically states that fuel

consumed idling is used in the operation of the vehicle.
is no "other use" made of the fuel.

There

The vehicle remains

operating at the discretion of the driver or the direction of the
company.

No "other purpose" is served that does not relate to

the normal operation of the motor vehicle.

The factors which

influence the Petitioners' decision to operate the motor vehicle
in this fashion must be weighed against the cost of operating the
vehicle, including taxable fuel consumed in that operation.
There is a distinct difference between Petitioners' use of
special fuel and the exempted uses identifed in the rule.

The

Commission did not "create" this exemption in its rules, the
Legislature provided for it by statute.

The Commission merely

recognized that running power take-off units is different from
operating a motor vehicle.

Such uses of special fuel involve
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simply running "auxiliary equipment" with a "separate drive
train" as Petitioners also recognized at the hearing.

(Tr. 20)

Rule R865-4-2D(D) merely clarifies the exemption which the
Legislature provided in Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301(2) (a) by
identifying specific instances where it has been demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the Commission that the fuel was used for
purposes "other than to operate a motor vehicle".
D.

THE ACT IS A PERMISSIBLE MEANS TO A ACHIEVE A
LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE.

The broad deference that courts will grant the Legislature
in determining the reasonableness of the relationship between
classifications and purposes means that:
Under the rational-basis, or least restrictive
standard, a statutory classification is constitutional
unless it has no rational relationship to any
reasonably conceivable legislative purpose.
Lee v. Gaufin, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 7 (Utah 1993). (Citations
omitted).
A court should assume that both the classifications and the
legislative purpose of the act are constitutional, even if that
purpose is unstated, unless the classification results in an
"invidious discrimination" or there is no rational relationship
between the two.

Id. at 7 and n.10.

(Citations omitted).

Though the Court will not "accept any conceivable reason for
the legislation" Blue Cross at 637, (citing Malan, 693 P.2d at
671 n. 14.) it does not require that the legislative purpose be
stated or proven.

Id. at 641. Nor does Article I section 24 of
21

the Utah Constitution require the Legislature to be "perfect" or
"logically precise" in its classifications.

It only requires

that the Legislature draw these classifications in a
"permissible" fashion.

See Little America, 785 P.2d at 1108 and

Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 644.
Raising revenue has been determined a legitimate legislative
purpose for tax statutes challenged under article I, § 24. See
Little America at 1108, Blue Cross at 640 and Mountain Fuel, 752
P.2d at 890-91.

Therefore, the tax statute in question satisfies

the second prong of the Blue Cross test.
The final prong is the reasonableness of the relationship
between the classification and the legislative purpose.
The legislature is not to be denied an "effective means
of raising needed revenues unless that means imposes an
unreasonable burden on the affected parties."
Blue Cross at 645.

Quoting Mountain Fuel at 891.

Little America at 1108.

See also.

Petitioners originally filed returns

recognizing the taxability of their operation and paying the tax.
(R. W-ll)

Petitioners' have failed to show that they are unduly

burdened by this tax.

Such failure has been fatal in similar

cases, and should be here.

See gen. Little America and Blue

Cross.
V.

THE ACT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE RELEVANT IFTA PROVISIONS.
Utah is a party to the International Fuel Tax Agreement

(IFTA).

The enabling legislation for that act provides:
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If the Commission enters into any agreement under the
authority of this section, and the provisions
established in the agreement are in conflict
with any
rules promulgated by the Commission, the agreement
provisions prevail.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-501(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
in the Rules conflicts

Nothing

with the relevant IFTA provisions.

Petitioner has cited no rule which it deems to conflict with any
provision of IFTA, nor has it demonstrated that invalidation of
any such rule would require a different result than was reached
by the Commission.

The enabling legislation upon which

Petitioners rely is clear.

It does not provide that IFTA

provisions should prevail over any statutory provisions.

Such a

delegation of power would be to grant more power to the IFTA
Board of Directors than retained by the Legislature!

The

Commission's ruling in this case is based on the plain language
of the Statute.

Nothing in the statute is in conflict with the

IFTA provisions, nor would IFTA prevail if it were.
Petitioners' argument displays a basic lack of understanding
of the International Fuel Tax Agreement.

Nothing in the

agreement can be construed as "imposing" any tax, or as limiting
the imposition of tax by the participating states.

The purpose

of the agreement is "to enable participating jurisdictions to act
cooperatively and provide mutual assistance in the administration
and collection of motor fuel taxes."
Section I.e.

IFTA Articles of Agreement

Under IFTA, both the imposition of taxes and the
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granting of exemptions are left exclusively to the states.

The

Procedures Manual for IFTA tax reporting, Section IV,A.9 states:
The licensee must report all fuel placed in the storage
tank of a qualified motor vehicle as taxable on the
IFTA tax report. Jurisdictions may define tax-exempt
fuel. The licensee must submit a claim for refund for
tax-exempt fuel
directly to the respective
jurisdiction.u
Utah has imposed a tax on all fuel sold or used.

It has

exempted fuel used for purposes "other than operation of a motor
vehicle."

Petitioners' use is taxable.

It has not demonstrated

"to the satisfaction of the commission" that its use falls within
the exemption.

The definition of the exemption and its

application to petitioners in this instance are in perfect
harmony with the provisions of the International Fuel Tax
Agreement.
CONCLUSION
The applicable statutes, rules and IFTA provisions create a
presumption that all fuel sold and placed in the supply tank of a
motor vehicle is taxable.

That presumption must hold unless

Petitioners have established to the satisfaction of the
Commission that the fuel they claim is exempt was used for
purposes "other than to operate a motor vehicle on the public
highways of the state."

They failed to do so.

The Commission

determined that "non-propulsion operation", as defined by
Petitioners, constituted "operation" of a motor vehicle on the
11

As amended by Ballot 7-1992 ratified Nov. 26 1992.
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public highways of the state.

There is no practical distinction

between the "non-propulsion operation" Petitioners seek to exempt
from taxation and that which they agree is taxable. Nonpropulsion operation, unlike exempted uses, is still "operation"
of the motor vehicle and therefore taxable*

Exemptions should be

narrowly construed and Petitioner bears the burden to show that
its activity comes squarely within the exemption.
have failed to meet that burden.

Petitioners

The Commission's decision is

rational and must be upheld.
DATED this

/*V

h

day of July, 1994.

ULARK L. 'SNELSON "
Assistant Attorney General

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

|"V

day of July, 1994, I

caused two (2) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, to be
mailed, postage prepaid, to:

CRAIG G. ADAMSON
ERIC P. LEE
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
310 South Main Street #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

//

/
-•<' x

26

APPENDIX 1

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1):
When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced
before the commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court
shall:
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence
standard on review; and
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its
conclusions of law, applying a correction or error
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion
contained in a statute at issue before the appellate
court.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-102 (1992 & Supp. 1993):
(3)(d) "Special fuel" means any fuel regardless of name or
character that:
(i) is usable as fuel to operate or propel a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of the state; and
(7) "Use," as used in Part 3, means the consumption of
special fuel for the operation or propulsion of a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of the state and
includes the reception of special fuel into the fuel
supply tank of a motor vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-301 (1992):
(1) A tax is imposed at the rate of 19 cents per gallon
on the sale or use of special fuel.
(2) No tax is imposed upon special fuel which:
(a) is sold or used for any purpose other than
to operate or propel a motor vehicle upon the
public highways of the state, but this
exemption applies only in those cases where
the purchasers or the users of special fuel
establish
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
commission that the special fuel was used for
purposes other than to operate a motor vehicle
upon the public highways of the state;
(b) is sold to the United States Government or
any of its instrumentalities or to this state
or any of its political subdivisions; or
(c) is sold and delivered into a motor vehicle
for which the owner or operator possesses an
unexpired
special
fuel
tax
exemption
certificate issued to that owner or operator
by the commission as provided in Section 5913-304 for vehicles powered by certain special

fuels•
(3) The special fuel tax shall be paid by the user-dealer
in all cases where the special fuel is sold within the
state and delivered directly into the fuel supply tank of
a motor vehicle unless the motor vehicle has a current
special fuel exemption certificate as provided in Section
59-13-304,
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-302 (1992):
(2) The user-dealer license application shall state:
(a) the places of business and locations from
which sales are made into motor vehicles or
from which retail sales of special fuel are
made;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-501 (1992):
(1) The commission may enter into cooperative agreements
with other states for the exchange of information and
auditing of users of motor fuel and special fuels used in
fleets of motor vehicles operated or intended to operate
interstate.
(7) If the commission enters into any agreement under the
authority of this section, and the provisions established
in the agreement are in conflict with any rules
promulgated by the commission, the agreement provisions
prevail.
Tax Comm. Rules R865-4-2D
B. The tax shall be collected and paid to the state by
the user-dealer in all cases where the fuel is sold and
delivered directly into the service tank of a motor
vehicle except in the following two cases:
1. The fuel is sold or delivered into vehicles
of the U.S. Government or to the state of Utah
or any of its political subdivisions.
2. The fuel is sold or delivered into a motor
vehicle for which the owner or operator
possesses an unexpired Special Fuel Tax
Exemption Certificate.
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D. No excise tax is imposed upon special fuel which is
sold or used for any purpose other than to operate or
propel a motor vehicle upon the public highways of the
state. For special fuel user-dealers this means that the
excise tax is not charged on bulk sales of special fuel
and other sales of special fuel where delivery is made
into a container other than the service tank of a motor
vehicle. For special fuel users this means that the
special fuel tax exemption is allowed for the following
three types of special fuel use:
1. Use other than in motor vehicles.
2. Use in vehicles off-highway.
3. Use in motor vehicles with power take-off
units.
4. Allowances herein provided for will be
recognized only if adequate records are
maintained to support the amount claimed.
5. Special fuel used on-highway for purposes
of idling a vehicle is not exempt from the
special fuel tax since the fuel is used in the
operation of a motor vehicle.
IFTA Articles of Agreement
I.C It is the purpose of this Agreement to enable
participating jurisdictions to act cooperatively and
provide mutual assistance in the administration and
collection of motor fuels use taxes.
III.C All motor fuel acquired that is normally subject to
consumption tax is taxable unless proof to the contrary
is provided by the licensee.
IFTA Procedures Manual
IV.A.9 The licensee must report all fuel placed in the
supply tank of a qualified motor vehicle as taxable on
the IFTA tax report. Jurisdictions may define tax-exempt
fuel. The licensee must submit a claim for refund for
tax paid on tax-exempt fuel directly to the respective
jurisdiction.
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